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Cyberspace: A Constitutionally Protected
Forum for Free Speech
Donald H. Flanary, 11*
Jessica J. Pritchett**
The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments,
including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature,
can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says
is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for the
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a
majority. Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it de-
nies the potential of this revolution if we assume the Government
is best positioned to make these choices for us.,
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is an international outlier when it comes to incarcera-
tion. At 716 incarcerated per 100,000 people,2 the United States has the high-
est incarceration rate in the world.3 In 2013, U.S. Attorney General Eric
Holder announced:
We need to ensure that incarceration is used to punish, deter and
rehabilitate-not merely to convict, warehouse and forget. Al-
though incarceration has a role to play in our justice system, wide-
spread incarceration at the federal, state and local levels is both
ineffective and unsustainable . . . It imposes a significant eco-
nomic burden-totaling $80 billion in 2010 alone-and it comes
with human and moral costs that are impossible to calculate.4
Studies show that crime is in fact on the decline in America, yet policymak-
ers at both the federal and state levels continue to create a stricter justice
* BS, Texas A&M Commerce; MA, St. Mary's University; and J.D., St. Mary's
University School of Law.
** Candidate for Juris Doctorate 2015, St. Mary's University School of Law.
1. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (Ken-
nedy, J.).
2. Nick Wing, Here Are All of the Nations That Incarcerate More of Their Popu-
lation than the U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2013 4:44 PM), http:/1
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/13/incarceration-rate-per-capita n_37452
91 .html#esshareended.
3. Highest to Lowest-Prison Population Total, INT'L CENTRE PRISON STUD.,
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prisonpopulationtotal?field_re
gion-taxonomy-tid=all (last visited Feb. 15. 2015).
4. Wing, supra note 2.
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system. 5 Criminalizing cyberspace and other avenues of free speech is just
one example of how both state and federal lawmakers are increasing these
shocking incarceration statistics.6 The creation of crime by prosecuting indi-
viduals in an area of American society that is controlled by (and should be
left to) civil courtrooms is illogical in the scheme of our national legal sys-
tem. This article highlights the First Amendment, the nature of the internet,
case precedent relating to speech, and specifically, why regulating irreverent
speech on the internet should be left to civil courts rather than legislatures
that criminalize antisocial comments.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Freedom of speech is a highly vaunted right in our society. Protected by
the First Amendment, free speech is a foundational attribute of our uniquely
American form of governance. 7 This right was intended to create an open
society in which all citizens could fearlessly participate in the conversation
about our national character and how it might be legislated.8 It was a bold
idea, even though women, Native Americans, African American slaves, and
the poor were not originally envisioned as part of that conversation.9
It has been a rather bumpy road from the crafting of the Constitution to
our present-day national conversation. Thanks to multiple forms of media
available to Americans, more people exercise their right to speak freely
amongst various forums than ever before. Much of what is said is not part of
a dialogue, but rather consists of personal thoughts and opinions. Our valua-
ble permission to speak freely has deteriorated into "having our say" or even
"telling them off." But, is that not also what the framers intended to protect?
The First Amendment's simple command that, "Congress shall make no
law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" 10 has become a
subject of great debate when it comes to electronic media and cyber-speech.II
The nature of cyberspace as a forum for speech has created many arguments
and varying laws to restrict, or limit restriction, of what citizens can or can-
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. See Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 1153, 1163 (2012).
9. See The Bill of Rights: A Brief History, Am. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 4,
2002), https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice-prisoners-rights-drug-Iaw-reform-
immigrants-rights/bill-rights-brief-history.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Robert Corn-Revere, Internet & First Amendment Overview, FIRST AMEND-




not express in this forum. The internet has been labeled by one federal judge
as the "most participatory form of mass speech yet developed."2
A. History and Text of the First Amendment
The full text of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances."13 The First Amendment was ratified
in 1791 when a political party known as the English Radical Whigs trans-
formed what they believed to be Christian liberties into natural rights and
political demands.14 Since 1791, there has been ongoing debate about what
the Framers of the First Amendment intended for the future of speech and the
press, especially in the search for a technical legal definition of speech.15
However, the Framers' commitment to freedom of conscience translated into
support for freedom of speech and of the press. Perhaps most significantly,
they recognized the category of speech would be molded over time by ad-
vancements in science and technology by citing broad categories to protect
citizens from government intervention and intrusion relating to social and
political ideas.16 With this background in mind, it was and is clear that First
Amendment protections will change as speech forums evolve and are created
in the future.
B. The Internet
Technology has created new issues and challenges for freedom of
speech, but the Constitution still applies when it comes to regulating the in-
ternet. In 1958, the U.S. military formed the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA)'7 to pioneer advancements in science and technology in or-
der to compete with the Soviet launch of Sputnik.18 The result of this forma-
12. David L. Hudson, Jr., Cyberspeech, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Apr. 9, 2002),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/cyberspeech.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. See David M. Rabban, The Original Meaning of the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: THE FIRST 200
YEARS 36, 37 (R.C. Simmons ed., 1989).
15. Id.
16. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); see also Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
17. See First 50 Years, DARPA, http://www.darpa.mil/About/History/
First_50 Years.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
18. Keenan Mayo & Peter Newcomb, How the Web Was Won: An Oral History of
the Internet, VANITY FAIR (July 2008), http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/fea
tures/2008/07/internet200807.
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tion was a security communication system to be used in times of emergency
when telephone systems may be damaged, making emergent communication
impossible.19 Since that time, the internet has become an avenue of change in
the way humans interact, learn, work, organize their daily lives, and expand
their business ventures.
Ill. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF CYBERSPACE
A quarter century ago, legal precedent in the United States reflected a
firm constitutional right of free expression. One of the first Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the internet as a forum for free speech, Reno v. ACLU,
held that the internet was a forum similar to newspaper publishing, worthy of
broad First Amendment protection.0 Those internet freedoms have also been
extended to social media platforms.
A. Cyberbullying
Cyberbullying is the use of the internet to deliberately bully, harass, or
intimidate someone.2 1 Many states have passed laws to criminalize online
bullying, however legislating cyberbullying is very difficult because of the
nature of the speech being scrutinized.22 The nature of cyberbullying is that
the words are online and are usually insulting someone's appearance, intelli-
gence, friends, or sexual preferences.23 Cyberbullying is often done anony-
mously, or the person who intended to make the statement cannot be
identified with certainty.24 It is very easy to create an identity online in a
social forum; therefore, it is difficult to establish exactly who intended the
statement to be threatening.25
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, such as a racist tweet,
from government intrusion.26 The First Amendment protects opinions even to
19. Id.
20. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
21. See What Is Cyberbullying, STOPBULLYING.COM, http://www.stopbullying.gov/
cyberbullying/what-is-itl (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter
Cyberbullying].
22. Video: Bad Behavior Online: Bullying, Trolling & Free Speech (Off Book PBS
Digital Studios 2012), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RVSA
FhTjAdc.
23. See Cyberbulling, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. See Kevin Turbert, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to
Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651, 653 (2009).
26. See Roasio v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-CV-362 JCM PAL, 2013 WL
3679375, at *4 (D. Nev. July 3, 2013).
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the extent that some individuals may view them as mean or socially
unpopular.2 7
Some people believe that laws should be written to establish a limit to
online speech. For example, in 2012 a New York senator proposed an anti-
cyberbullying bill that would have essentially banned all anonymous online
speech.28The bill would have required website administrators to remove any
anonymous comment upon request, unless the poster agreed to reveal his
name and his home address.29 This legislation undermined the constitutional
right to speak anonymously on issues of public interest, a right affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court multiple times.30
In its newest speech code report, the Foundation for Individual Rights in
Education cites that "nearly 60 [percent] of the 427 colleges and universities
analyzed maintain policies that seriously infringe upon the free speech rights
of students."31 Several public universities have formed "speech codes" that
ban constitutionally protected speech.32 For example, in 2014 one state uni-
versity adopted an anti-cyberbullying rule defining cyberbullying as "harsh
text messages or emails."33 Under such a broad rule, simply texting a room-
mate with an angry tone about not doing their part of the roommate duties
could be skewed to cause a student to face disciplinary consequences for
expressing a very common human emotion under such a policy. When codes
such as these are challenged in court, they are very often struck down by
judges as being overly broad or having the effect of unnecessarily chilling
27. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011).
28. Video: Fakhoury: NY Cyberbullying Law Could Violate Freedom of Speech
(Bloomberg Law 2011), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BZF-
xlogHSk.
29. Id.
30. See id. (highlighting that emotional harm is an objective standard that cannot
pass constitutional muster).
31. Spotlight on Speech Codes 2014: The State of Free Speech on Our Nation's
Campuses, FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, http://issuu.
com/thefireorg/docs/2014_speechlcode-report-final?e=6851166/6373933 (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015).
32. What Are Speech Codes?, FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCA-
TION, http://www.thefire.org/spotlight/what-are-speech-codes/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2015) [hereinafter Speech Codes]; see also Stand Up For Speech, FOUNDA-
TION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, http://www.standupforspeech
.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (listing Modesto Junior College, University of
Hawaii-Hilo, Iowa State University, Citrus College, Chicago State University,
Ohio University, and Western Michigan University).
33. Free Speech, Western Michigan University - Stand Up for Speech, FOUNDA-
TION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, http://www.thefire.org/cases/
western-michigan-university-stand-speech/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
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speech.34 On the other hand, K-12 schools are allowed some discretion in
protecting young students in the schooling environment.35
B. Geographic Anonymity: Jurisdiction as an Additional Hurdle for
Prosecuting Online Speech
An attempt to regulate internet speech creates many issues within our
justice system, including jurisdictional issues. The internet is such a global
instrument, and likewise it is nearly impossible to formulate a concrete
method of determining jurisdiction as to the cyber-speech that may be at
issue. For example, if someone makes a controversial tweet that speech could
qualify as illegal hate speech. In 2013, French citizens sued Twitter, demand-
ing the identities of anonymous tweets described as anti-Semitic.36 Hate
speech, as offensive as it may be, is still protected by free speech laws in the
United States.37 However, in France, the tweets were not legal and the French
court ruled that Twitter had to turn over the information requested by the
French government. 38 Should Twitter be legally required to do this? There
are many issues here: different countries have different ideas and policy pro-
cedures regulating the internet, our existing remedies for resolving interna-
tional conflicts are not adequate to resolve internet disputes of this kind, and
with 192 countries utilizing the internet, there is no one-size-fits-all solution
to this jurisdictional issue.
In another case, a German court could not seize a Facebook account as
evidence against a German citizen accused of burglary, because, although
Facebook has an office in Hamburg, the data was located on a server in the
United States.39 While it is fairly simple to locate the geographical location,
34. See Speech Codes, supra note 32.
35. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding
that students and teachers don't "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (holding that school officials may search a stu-
dent's property if they have a "reasonable suspicion" that a school rule has
been broken, or a student has committed or is in the process of committing a
crime).
36. Katia Moskvitch, Twitter Told to Reveal Details of Racist Users, BBC NEWS
TECH. (June 13, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-22887988.
37. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 391 (1992); Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S.
43, 44 (1977); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); see also Virginia v. Black, 528 U.S. 343, 363
(2003) (allowing state regulation of hate speech only if extremely intimidating
or directly inciting violence).
38. Moskvitch, supra note 36.




online activity involves potentially incompatible laws, because the virtual
frontier can contain service providers, actors, and intermediaries in various
physical locations making it a cross-border avenue for speech. The servers
and the providers may be in varying jurisdictions, causing difficulties in ac-
curately pinpointing the proper jurisdiction to address issues of online
speech.
IV. A HISTORY OF INTERPRETING OPINIONATED SPEECH
A. Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Landmark Case for Freedom of Speech
In a landmark opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed Mr. Brandenburg's
criminal conviction for statements made at a private political rally. Branden-
burg made a speech at a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) rally and was convicted under
color of an Ohio criminal syndicalism law.40 This statute made it illegal to
advocate "crime sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well to assemble
"with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advo-
cate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."41 The Supreme Court utilized a
two-part test to determine whether the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's free
speech.42 They opined that speech could be prohibited if it is "directed at
inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and it is "likely to incite or
produce such action."43
Applying this new test, the Court struck down Ohio's statute on its face,
because the statute lacked a requirement to show intent on behalf of the per-
son(s) to incite imminent lawless action or that lawless action was even likely
to result.44 In Mr. Brandenburg's case, the court held that while the rally was
hateful, the sentiments of the KKK were not an immediate danger to others
around the rally.45 Specifically, the Court held that "the mere abstract teach-
ing ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force
and violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action."46
Brandenburg v. Ohio is one example of the Supreme Court's commit-
ment to protecting freedom of speech. As one scholar has put it, "Branden-
burg v. Ohio gave the greatest protection to what could be called subversive
speech that it has ever had in the United States, and almost certainly greater
40. Id. at 444-45.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 447-48.
43. Id. at 447.
44. Id. at 448-49.
45. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
46. Id. (quoting Noto v. United States 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
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than such speech has in any other country."47 While words may be offensive
to some citizens or may lead to political discourse, those comments and opin-
ions are appropriate even in the form of a large group such as the Ku Klux
Klan.48 Brandenburg relates to cyber-speech in the context of this article be-
cause rarely, if ever, can a written threat among individuals online, or in an
opinionated or hateful email be construed as an imminent threat to safety.
B. Watts v. United States: Requiring a True Threat to Silence
Political Speech
On August 27, 1966, Robert Watts, an eighteen-year-old African Amer-
ican man, attended a protest. 49 After an individual stated that the protesters
should educate themselves before expressing their views, Mr. Watts uttered
his opinion about being forced to join the military.50 Mr. Watts stated, "I
have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report
for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J."51 At the time
this case was litigated, a federal statute from 1917 made it a crime to know-
ingly or willfully threaten the life of the President of the United States.52
Watts was tried for this crime and convicted in a federal court.53 He ap-
pealed, claiming that he did not make a true and legitimate threat within the
language of the statute since he had no intent to follow through.54 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected Watt's argument, and
found that the statement violated the statute even if Watts did not intend to
carry out the "threat."55
47. Susan M. Gilles, Brandenburg v. State of Ohio: An "Accidental, " "Too Easy,"
and "Incomplete" Landmark Case, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 520 (2010) (quot-
ing ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 236 (1st ed. 1991)); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Branden-
burg and the United States' War on Incitement Abroad: Defending a Double
Standard, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2002) ("Brandenburg thus
spreads a broad mantel of protection over the speech of radical, political dissi-
dents from even the most despised groups in society."); Marc Rohr, Grand
Illusion? The Brandenburg Test and Speech That Encourages or Facilitates
Criminal Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (labeling the Brandenburg
test as "extraordinarily speech-protective.").
48. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
49. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
50. Id. at 706.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 705.
53. Id. at 678.
54. Id.
55. Watts, 394 U.S. at 678-82.
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In Watts v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the case, holding that although 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1964) prohibiting
threats against the President was constitutional, Robert Watts's speech was
not a "true threat."56 Citing New York Times v. Sullivan,57 the Court labeled
the words spoken by Mr. Watts, "If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.," as a "political hyperbole" that was
protected by the principle that public debate on political issues should remain
open to uninhibited, robust speech, even if the speech may be "vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."58 This case highlights the importance of allowing individuals to
have their say even if that say is unpopular political speech. So long as the
speech is not a "true threat," it is protected by the First Amendment. 59 The
Supreme Court recognized that even though Mr. Watts talked about shooting
the President, the context of his words, a political rally, showed that they did
not present a serious threat, a true threat, or a real threat.60 In fact, the Su-
preme Court said:
[T]he statute initially requires the Government to prove a true
"threat." We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole
indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term ... Taken
in context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the
statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not see how it
could be interpreted otherwise.61
C. Virginia v. Black: A Question of Intent in the Context of Free
Speech
In the landmark case Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court held that
Barry Black could not be convicted for cross burning merely on evidence
that he burned a cross. 62 The Virginia statute banned the burning of crosses
with "an intent to intimidate a person or persons," but the court gave a jury
instruction that the requisite intent could be found, which would allow for
conviction, upon a simple prima facie showing that Black burned a cross in
plain view.63 Based on the instruction, Mr. Black was convicted by a jury,
and he subsequently appealed.64 The Supreme Court held that the statute al-
56. Id. at 712.
57. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
58. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 706, 708 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
59. See id. at 707.
60. See id. at 708.
61. Id.
62. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
63. Id. at 348.
64. Id. at 349-5 1.
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lowing the state to punish cross burning was permissible, but the jury instruc-
tion in Black's trial instructing that a cross burning in plain view was "prima
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate," was facially unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.65 The Supreme Court cited the First Amendment as the
"hallmark of the protection of free speech [which] allow[s] '[theifree trade
[of] ideas-even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find
distasteful or discomforting."66 The Court concluded that, "'[t]rue threats'
encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a seri-
ous expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a partic-
ular individual or group of individuals."67
D. United States v. O'Dwyer: E-mails Involving Statements Not
Considered True Threats
In 2010, upset with a bankruptcy judge, Ashton O'Dwyer sent an e-mail
containing horrendously insensitive and inflammatory remarks to the judge.68
In his e-mail, O'Dwyer wrote "[m]aybe my creditors would benefit from my
suicide, but suppose I become 'homicidal'? Given the recent 'security
breach' at 500 Poydras Street, a number of scoundrels might be at risk if I
DO become homicidal."69 He was then charged by the government under the
federal terroristic threat statute and filed his own pro se Motion to Dismiss.70
His motion was primitive and as bare as one could ever be. O'Dwyer's Mo-
tion No. 8 called for the court, "[to dismiss the indictment upon the grounds
that the defendant's words were non-criminal and constitutionally protected
free speech" under Watts v. United States.71
Mr. O'Dwyer relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Watts in this sim-
ple, yet succinct, Motion to Dismiss. At the hearing on the Motion to Dis-
miss, the Judge dismissed the charge before trial, claiming, "[t]he Court finds
that Defendant's statements are insufficient to warrant submission to a jury to
determine if they are a true threat."72
The government appealed, but then the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the pre-trial dismissal, saying that it is appropriate for a trial judge to
dismiss a case when it is determined that "no reasonable jury could find that
65. Id. at 348-52.
66. Id. at 358 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919)) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 359 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)); Watts
v. United States, 394 U.S. 708 (1969).
68. United States v. O'Dwyer, No. 10-034, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62978 (E.D. La.
June 24, 2010).
69. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at *1.
71. Motion To Dismiss, Doc. 61-7, O'Dwyer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62978.
72. O'Dwyer, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62978 at *7.
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O'Dwyer's communication constituted a true threat." 73 In its affirmation of
the dismissal, the Fifth Circuit Court took into consideration the Supreme
Court's Ruling in Virginia v. Black.74
E. United States v. Bagdasarian: Offensive Posts Online Are Not
Necessarily "True Threats"
The Fifth Circuit is not the only circuit to hold that a person's state-
ments must contain "true threats" as a matter of law in order for the person to
be prosecuted under terroristic threat statutes.75 In the Ninth Circuit case of
United States v. Bagdasarian, Walter Bagdasarian posted some very offen-
sive, racist, and violent statements about President Barack Obama on the
internet.76 Mr. Bagdasarian was very irate about President Obama's health-
care policies and stated, "[r]e: Obama fk the niggar, he will have a 50 cal in
the head soon ... shoot the nig country fkd for another 4 years+, what nig
has done ANYTHING right???? long term???? never in history, except
sambos."77
The Secret Service was rightfully concerned about the contents of
Bagdasarian's posts, and investigated. Upon investigation, the Secret Service
found that Mr. Bagdasarian actually possessed a rare, but very lethal and
powerful .50 caliber rifle capable of long-range sniper attacks.78 As a result
of this fact, Bagdasarian was charged and convicted of threatening the Presi-
dent.79 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Bagdasarian's nasty comments
did not constitute a true threat, holding "[t]here is nevertheless insufficient
evidence that either statement constituted a threat or would be construed by a
reasonable person as a genuine threat by Bagdasarian against Obama."80
F. Scott v. State: Combating an Overbroad Statute that
Inappropriately Chills Speech, a Texas Cyberbullying Statute
Lower courts prove to be even more inconsistent in how they determine
whether speech is truly threatening. Some states require subjective intent to
harm, while others only require a more generalized "objective" intent to
73. United States. v. O'Dwyer, 443 F. App'x 18, 20 (5th Cir. 2011).
74. Id. at 20.
75. See United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
added).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 1115.
78. Id. at 1121.
79. Id. at 1130.
80. Id. at 1120.
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communicate.81 For example, in 2010, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
heard the case of Scott v. State,82 after a Texas Court of Appeals in San
Antonio held that Section 42.07 of the Texas Penal Code entitled "Harass-
ment" is an unconstitutionally vague statute.83 The portion of the statute rele-
vant to this discussion reads as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to harass, annoy,
alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another, the person:
(4) causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or makes
repeated telephone communications anonymously or in a manner
reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embar-
rass, or offend another;
(7) sends repeated electronic communications in a manner reason-
ably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or
offend another.84
The court of appeals explained that what may be "annoying," "embar-
rassing," or even "alarming" may be speech that is protected by the First
Amendment.85 The Court gave examples of both political calls that may be
made for a particular candidate and talk radio or commercials on television.86
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the statute was not un-
constitutionally vague and reversed the San Antonio Court of Appeals deci-
sion.87 Justice Keller wrote a dissenting opinion that began by highlighting
legal authority that "set the backdrop for the claim ... " before the court in
Scott v. State.88 Specifically the courts in Long v. State,89 May v. State,90 and
Kramer v. Price9' invalidated statutes that contained some of the same terms
81. See generally Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Scott II]; Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); May v.
State, 765 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Kramer v. Price, 723 F.2d 1164
(5th Cir. 1984) (analyzing the intent needed for a statement to be a true threat).
82. Scott 11, 322 S.W.3d at 662.
83. See Scott v. State, 298 S.W.3d 264, 267, 269, 270 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2009, pet. granted) (holding that Section 42.07 implicated the free speech guar-
antee of the First Amendment) [hereinafter Scott I].
84. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a) (West 2011).
85. See Scott 1, 298 S.W.3d at 269.
86. Id.
87. Scott If, 322 S.W.3d at 668.
88. Id. at 671-72.
89. Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
90. May v. State, 765 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
91. Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983).
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that were contested in this case, "annoy" and "alarm," and held that these
terms implicate First Amendment freedoms because they are unduly vague.9 2
In her dissent, Justice Keller also discusses the ambiguity of the word "re-
peated" in the statute as to whether repeated means that the incidents must be
close in time or multiple instances of the same scheme. 93 It is clear that this
statute as written allows plenty of discretion for the state to prosecute unpop-
ular and unpleasant speech and thereby chills avenues of free speech.
G. Elonis v. United States: The Case That Could "Change
Everything"
On December 1, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
Elonis v. United States.94 To date, Anthony Elonis has served more than three
years in prison for posting words on his Facebook page, which he has now
categorized as "therapeutic" rap lyrics.95 In 2010, Elonis' wife of seven years
left with their two children, and Elonis was fired from his job.96 He then
began posting lyrics on Facebook that he claims were not intended as a warn-
ing of material violence, but rather were his harmless expression of the emo-
tion that overwhelmed him after his wife left him.97 The issue in that case
turned on subjective versus objective intent. At Mr. Elonis' trial, the jury was
given a legal standard by which to evaluate the Facebook posts.98 The in-
struction asserted that the Facebook posts may be considered a "true threat,"
unprotected by the First Amendment, if they-meaning members of the
jury-considered Elonis' post to be threatening.99 Mr. Elonis' contention was
that the Facebook post should not have been evaluated objectively by the
jury, but rather the words should be considered subjectively, evaluating
whether he intended the post to be a threat. 0
92. Id. at 178 ("By failing to provide reasonably clear guidelines § 42.07 gives
officials unbounded discretion to apply the law selectively and subjects the
exercise of the right of speech to an unascertainable standard.").
93. See Scott I, 322 S.W.3d at 672.
94. Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert. granted 134 S. Ct.
2819 (June 16, 2014) (No. 12-3798) [hereinafter Elonis I1].
95. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Elonis v. United States, No. 11-13, 2011 WL
5024284 (E.D. Penn. 2011) (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 645438, at *5.
96. Elonis H, 730 F.3d at 327.
97. Elonis v. United States, 2011 WL 5024284 (E.D. Penn. 2011) [hereinafter
Elonis I].
98. Id.
99. Elonis II, 730 F.3d at 327.
100. Id.
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This opinion, written by a notably free-speech-friendly group of Su-
preme Court justices,OI will decide (1) whether in the age of social media
Mr. Elonis' behavior was outside of the norm; and (2) whether Mr. Elonis'
written expression in the form ofFacebook posts may be considered "true
threats" as defined by Virginia v. BlackO2 in 2003. In Elonis' petition for
Supreme Court review, he claims that this "issue is growing in importance as
communication online by e-mail and social media has become common-
place."103 He goes on to assert that "[m]odern media allow personal reflec-
tions intended for a small audience (or no audience) to be viewed widely by
people who are unfamiliar with the context in which the statements were
made and thus who may interpret the statements much differently than the
speakers intended."04 Similarly, in one of the many amicus briefs filed in
this case, The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression
argued that legal implementation of a subjective standard is necessary, be-
cause "unique communicative norms emerge and evolve, heightening the
likelihood of misinterpretation by juries not intimately familiar with these
novel means of expression."105 Elonis v. United States addresses a pertinent
issue courts are confronted with when evaluating whether or not to prosecute
online speech-the speaker's actual intent for the publicized dialogue. While
the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments for up to fifty differ-
ent cases over the next few months,06 Elonis has been noted as the case that
could "change everything" due to the widespread effect this opinion will
have on modern speech.107
101. Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech Often Means 'Speech I Agree With',
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/
us/politics/in-justices-votes-free-speech-often-means-speech-i-agree-with.html
?_r=O.
102. See Virginia v. Black, 528 U.S. 343 (2003).
103. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Elonis v. United States, No. 11-13, 2011 WL
5024284 (E.D. Penn. 2011) (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 645438.
104. Id.
105. Brief for The Thomas Jefferson Center for The Protection of Free Expression,
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d
321 (3d. Cir. 2013) (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 4298029, at *4.
106. Argument Calendar, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-calendars.aspx (last visited
Oct. 23, 2014).
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H. Current Bullying Case in the News
Children have been bullying each other for generations. Millions of
teens are bullied annually. This fact is an all too common reality of adoles-
cence. According to John Wright, a pediatrician at Children's National
Health System in Washington, D.C., seventy-five percent of kids have been
exposed to the pervasive behavior of bullying, either as bystanders or as the
ones being bullied.08 Whether we were bullied on the playground, by a sib-
ling, or by someone on social media, just about everyone has experienced
some sort of negative experience with the words of another person that are
socially unacceptable, rude or hurtful. However, society, teachers, and par-
ents are the ones who should be dealing with this all too common situation,
not the justice system.
Two young girls, ages twelve and fourteen, are facing felony charges in
Florida for harassing a classmate who allegedly committed suicide after be-
ing harassed in an online chat by up to fifteen girls from her school.109 After
a sheriff saw one of the girl's comments online about the suicide, he took her
into custody.Io The post stated "Yes ik [I know] I bullied REBECCA nd
[and] she killed her[ ]self but [I don't care]."II' While this statement is cer-
tainly not friendly or kind, the fact remains that this young girl was merely
making an immature and juvenile comment, not a criminal one.
V. CiviL ACTION AS A REMEDY FOR ONLINE BEHAVIOR
The underlying acts that constitute cyberbullying are already covered in
civil actions under the law. Regardless of whether the content was expressed
online or in person, conventional tort law offers a remedy for harassment,
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.12 While the rem-
edies may vary depending on state law, the basic elements of these causes of
action are substantially similar.113 Civil harassment involves willful and mali-
cious acts with intent to cause a reaction. To prove intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the plaintiff must show that the harasser's conduct was
"so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly in-
108. Nanci Hellmich, Lessons Learned from Latest Cyberbully, USA TODAY (Oct.
16, 2013, 12:18 PM EDT), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
10/15/cyberbullying-parents-intemet-guide/2988651/.
109. Eli Federman, Bullying is Bad, But Criminalizing Bullying Would Be Even
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2014]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
tolerable in a civilized community."'14 The victim also needs to prove that he
suffered damage as the result of the action of the defendant, such as financial,
physical or psychological injury. To prove defamation, the victim usually
must show that the defendant negligently or willfully, wantonly, recklessly,
or intentionally made an untrue statement regarding the plaintiff, published
the statement to others, and in doing so, caused damage to the victim.
In Texas, The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress are:
(1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly;
(2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous;
(3) the acts of the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional dis-
tress; and
(4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe."15
This is a prime example of a civil cause of action that covers many of the
cases that are now resulting in unnecessary criminal prosecution over words
that cause mental and emotional harm to others.
Civil actions have been the proper remedy until recent years in which
the actor was first required to pay on the personal damage to individuals. The
Internet has magnified this issue because words are often permanently docu-
mented and may be viewed by multiple people rather than just the person the
message was intended to reach. However, this fact does not change the truth
that people have been insulting others for generations. Moreover, the world-
wide reach of the internet may magnify the degree of damage caused by
anonymous online conduct beyond that of the typical in person encounter.
VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment is essentially a promise made to the American
people by the government. It enables Americans to maintain considerable
freedom of speech with other personal rights and societal interests such as
privacy, reputation, national security, and obscenity. While some types of
expression are not protected by the First Amendment, cyber-speech is a form
of speech that, as the law stands today, does not allow for government intru-
sion if it does not fall into one of the categories justifying government inter-
vention. Additionally, the government cannot expect to legislate social
norms.
The high crime rate in America is considerably costly to taxpayers, with
state governments bearing the majority of the fiscal burden. Imposing crimi-
nal consequences for hurting someone's feelings, an unfortunate reality of
society, is not a rational or useful utilization of our legal resources. Resorting
to criminalizing hurtful words is just as frightening as the innocent young girl
being told she is "ugly" and "should go kill herself." Furthermore, the law in
114. Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303 (1983).




itself does not alter cyberbullying or unpopular expression in the online fo-
rum. Rather, we need to have a national conversation about early intervention
from bullying, civility, and widespread education of the permanent nature of
our internet interactions, rather than resorting to criminal prosecutions.l16 As
long as humans harbor opinions and a means to express those thoughts and
opinions, we will be regulating those opinions as a last resort to chilling the
freedom the First Amendment promises.
116. See Dr. Gwenn's Family Media Use Plan (Aug. 22, 2011), http://
www.pediatricsnow.com/2011/08/dr-gwenns-family-media-plan-2/ (outlining a
Media Time Family Pledge for Kids and Teens to act responsibly online, and
for parents to properly monitor their child's online and social activity).
2014]

